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Platonism vs. Nominalism in
Contemporary Musical Ontology
ANDREW KANIA

*

I. Introduction
Ontological theories of musical works fall into two broad classes, according
to whether or not they take musical works to be abstract objects of some
sort.

I shall use the terms 'Platonism' and

'nominalism' to refer to these two

kinds of theory.1 In this chapter I first outline contemporary Platonism
about musical works-the theory that musical works are abstract objects.

I

then consider reasons to be suspicious of such a view, motivating a

consideration of nominalist theories of musical works.

I

argue for two

conclusions: first, that there are no compelling reasons to be a nominalist
about musical works in particular, i.e. that nominalism about musical works
rests on arguments for thoroughgoing nominalism; and, second, that if
Platonism fails, fictionalism about musical works is to be preferred
to other nominalist ontologies of musical works. If you think in terms
of realism vs. anti-realism about musical works, then one way of putting
this is to say that realism about musical works stands or falls with Platonism
about musical works.2 That's because, for methodological reasons I discuss
below, a theory according to which musical works are concrete objects of
some sort is not a realist theory of musical works, properly understood. This

* Thanks to Curtis Brown and Christy Mag Uidh ir

for helpful discussion of the issues addressed in

this chapter, and to Trinity University for financial support.
1

Nominalists about musical works may be Platonim about cc.her entities, such as numbers (and, in

principle, vice versa). When I discuss a view according to which there are no abstract entities at all, I call
it 'thoroughgoing norninalism'.
•

Thanks to Christy Mag Uidhir for bringing this p ersp ective to my attention.
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chapter is thus a contribution to the debate over the fundamental ontology
of works of Western classical music, broadly construed, though its conclu
sions could be applied to other musical (or artistic or cultural) practices
that are sufficiently similar, if such there be.3

II. Contemporary Platonism about Musical Works
The basic questions in the fundamental ontology of musical works are the
same as those of any topic in ontology: (1) 'Are there any?' And (2) 'If so, what
kinds of things are they?' These questions cannot be approached separately for
musical works any more than they can for numbers, ordinary objects, persons,
possible worlds, and so on. On the one hand, the nature of the thing in
question may provide strong reasons for thinking there are not any such
things. For instance, one might argue that the concept of a soul is essentially
incoherent, and thus that there can be no souls. On the other hand, one might
take there to be such compelling reasons for thinking a particular kind of thing
exists that one posits it despite its odd nature, or the problems it creates in
other areas of inquiry. For instance, one might argue that numbers (conceived
of as abstracta) are indispensible to our best theories of the world, and thus that
they must exist, even though it is difficult to understand how there could be
such things, or how we could know anything about them.
A couple of basic features of musical works might lead one to think that
their ontology would be no different from that of something like properties:
(i) musical works are 'multiple' or 'repeatable'; they have 'instances' (per
formances), none of which can intuitively be identified with the work. Yet
(ii) we have 'access' to or come into 'contact' with the work 'through' or
'in' any one of these instances. In fact, as I have argued elsewhere, the early
history of musical ontology can be read as a kind of applied debate over the
problem of universals (Kania 2008a, pp. 426-7).4 More recently, Julian

> For the distinction between 'fundamental' and 'higher-order· musical oncology. see Kania 2008b.
There is some debate over how broadly we should construe 'Western classical music' if our aim is to
include musical practices cencered around the perfom1ance ofworks. (Lydia Goehr 2007, especially chs
7--9) is well known for arguing for a narrow construal. For a defense of the more traditional broader
construal, see S. Davies 2001, pp. 86-<)1. I will not enter that debate here.
I have primarily in mind here the work ofNelson Goodman (1976 (first published 1968)); Kiehm!
WoUheim (1980 (first published 1968)); and Nicholas Woltcrstorff(1980).
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Dodd (2007) has argued, pretty much exclusively on the basis of these two
features, that musical works are eternal, unstructured, unchanging, modally
inflexible, abstract types. s
But musical works have further, equally basic, features that do not allow
their ontology (or debates about it) to be assimilated to that of properties
so easily. For instance, (iii) musical works are intentionally created by
composers; (iv) they are normative, both in the sense that they specify
how their performances should go, and in the sense that they admit of
better and worse performances; and (v) they possess aesthetic or artistic
properties that seem to depend on the cultural context of their composition.
To hold that these latter features, and others like them, are relevant to the
ontology of music is to subscribe to a methodological principle held by
many ontologists of art over the last thirty years, a principle now widely
known, thanks to the work of David Davies, as 'the pragmatic constraint'
(2004, p. 18). The principle is so-called not because of any connection with
the philosophical theories of Pierce, James, and Dewey, but because it takes
artistic practices to be the yardstick against which ontologies of art should be
measured. As Davies puts it:
Artworks must be entities that can bear the sorts of properties rightly ascribed
to what are termed 'works' in our reflective critical and appreciative practice; that
are individuated in the way such 'works' are or would be individuated, and that
have the modal properties that are reasonably ascribed to works' in that practice.
'

,

(2004, p. 18)

The basic rationale of the principle is simple, and familiar from other areas
of metaphysics: we ought to believe that those things exist which are
required by our best theories of how things are. When we ask ontological
questions about numbers we rightly take our best mathematical theories to
be our most important evidence base; when we ask ontological questions
about music, we rightly take our best musical theories to be our most
important evidence base. It is worth noting that 'musical theories' here
does not just mean music theory, narrowly construed, or even musicology
in a traditional sense. It is, rather, our best understanding of this entire
cultural sphere, of everything that goes on in the production and reception

•

•

Dodd explicitly acknowledges his debt t0 Wolterscorff(Dodd 2007, p. 100).
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of music, that is our evidence base for ontological claims about music. This
is because, to quote Davies once more:
[O]ur philosophical interest in 'art' and in 'artworks' is grounded precisely in
[artistic] practice. It is because certain features of that practice puzzle us, or because
the entities that enter into that practice fascinate us, that we are driven to
philosophical reflection about art in the first place. To offer an 'ontology of art'
not subject to the pragmatic constraint would be to change the subject, rather than
answer the questions that motivate philosophical aesthetics. (2004, p. 21)

Davies has been criticized for making unjustified exclusions from this
evidence base. I, for one, have argued that Davies is led astray by not ta k in g
seriously enough the ontological implications of our artistic practices,
including our ontological intuitions (Kania 2008a, pp. 429-32). In Art as
Performance, his ontological magnum opus, Davies claims that:
... in reflecting upon our artistic practice in this way, the intuitions that
are strongest will be those that relate to practical aspects of that practice ... judgments made, ways in which entities are treated, etc.-rather than intuitions
about what works are, ontologically speaking. (2004, p. 22)

But either I misunderstood Davies or he has taken this criticism to heart, for
in a recent discussion of the pragmatic constraint, he says that he does not
'deny that there are ontological dimensions to some aspects of our practice',
though he notes that 'these judgments, like other features of our artistic
practice, can constrain ontological theorizing only when subject to rational
reflection' (2009, p. 163).6
Robert Stecker has recently argued for a further broadening of the
evidence base for musical ontology:
Of course we should look at our musical practices and linguistic usage, ... but that
should only be a starting point. There are many sciences that study music, including
musicology, music theory, psychology, and anthropology. Why shouldn't these
studies generate data that are just as valuable for the philosopher? (2009,

p.

383)

I am sympathetic to this approach in general. For instance, I myself have
suggested that those interested in a definition of music would do well
to consider recent work in the psychology of music (Kania 2011a), and
Davies does not comment in this essay on whether this acknowledgement would impact his
arguments for his own ontology of the arts.
6
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philosophers discussing musical understanding frequently make reference
to the work of music theorists (e.g. Huovinen 20II). But I am not sure how
much ofa departure this implies from current best practices in the ontology of
art, including musical ontology. On the one hand, it is not clear how some
of these disciplines (psychology and music theory) could contribute to
musical ontology in particular.7 On the other, while musicology and an
thropology seem more promising in this regard, precisely because they aim
to describe musical practices, it seems to me that (good) musical ontologists
already appeal to such evidence. After all, when Davies appeals to the ways
in which people talk about certain artworks (he is concerned with art in
general, not just music), he appeals to what critics and art historians say.
Such evidence seems to be the equivalent of musicological and anthropo
logical data in this context. Similarly, when Theodore Gracyk (1996) argues
for the work of art in rock music's being the recording, rather than the song
or live performance, he appeals to rock criticism and musicology. We might
sometimes hope for better musicology and anthropology-more systematic,
objective, and wide ranging-but in the meantime we must make do with
what we have.
The pragmatic constraint is touted as a methodological principle used
to arrive at the best ontological theory of artworks. But as such it can also
be used critically, to reject theories that do not respect the principle. One
such theory that I have already mentioned is Julian Dodd's ontology of
musical works. Recall that Dodd argues, on the basis of (i) their repeatability;
and (ii) the fact that they can be heard in performances, that musical works
are eternal, unstructured, unchanging, modally inflexible, abstract types
(Dodd 2007). Dodd thus violates the pragmatic constraint in two related
ways. Most obviously, he ignores vast tracts of musical practice (e.g. taking
composition to be work creation and the attribution of aesthetic and artistic
properties to works) until after he has established his preferred ontological
theory, at which point he explains away such data, either by rejecting
it outright (e.g. composition as creation) or by supplying paraphrases of the
relevantjudgements (e.g. as attributing aesthetic properties not to works but
to performances). The second violation of the pragmatic constraint is
more subtle, and occurs as Dodd is establishing his view. Dodd argues very
' Stecker admits that his new suggestion's 'potential for providing better data for an ontology ofmusic
is as yet unknown· (2009, p. 384).
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early on that his view is a (in fact

the)

'simple' one, the 'default' view, given

the repeatability of works and their audibility in performances (2007, p.

passim). But judgements of simplicity
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Note that however one formulates the metaphysical constraint it must

I

appeal to something like our best general metaphysical theories. One

(to say nothing of default) are always

problem with this is that it is not clear what our best general metaphysical

relative and contextual. Two prominent aspects of the way in which Dodd

theories are. The fact that contemporary guidebooks to metaphysics still

motivates his view show that its simplicity depends on taking what

take the problem of universals to be a central issue in metaphysics suggests

I

that even if contemporary metaphysics is not mere footnotes to Plato, large

et

have called the 'metaphysical constraint' at least as seriously as the

pragmatic constraint (Kania 2008a, pp. 434-8). According to the metaphysical

chunks of it might still be considered appendices to Plato and Aristotle.9

constraint, our ontological theories of art, as far as possible, ought to appeal

For instance, Dodd takes the existence of abstract types to be relatively

only to entities posited by our best general metaphysical theories.8 The fact

uncontroversial, while nominalists about musical works tend to start from

that in motivating his view Dodd considers only the two features of musical

the premise that we ought not appeal to abstracta if we can avoid it at all

works that make them seem most like simple properties is one sign that he

(a point

implicitly endorses the metaphysical constraint. If musical works must belong
to a well-established ontological category, then one promising approach is to
ask: Of those things investigated by general metaphysicians, which are most
like musical works? And 'properties' seems a plausible answer to this question.
The other, more explicit sign that Dodd subscribes to the metaphysical
constraint is the way in which he talks about types when he proposes them
as the best candidate for the ontological category to which musical works
belong. He claims that upon recognition that musical works are 'generic
entities', that is, repeatable:

return to below). •0

as opposed to a specialized theory such as an ontological theory of musical
works. There are two ways one could conceive of this opposition,
inclusively and exclusively, but both cause problems for the metaphysical
constraint. Considered

inclusively,

our best general metaphysical theory is a

metaphysical theory of everything, including, for instance, musical works
(if such there be). But clearly there cannot be a consensus on such a theory
without a consensus

on the ontology of musical works,

latter is part of the former. Considered

exclusively,

since the

one need not wait

for a consensus on the ontology of musical �orks before achieving

[wje are ... invited to treat [them] as types because .. . we thereby provide a familiar
and plau sible explanation ofthe nature of the relation holding betw ee n a work and
its occurrences ...Rather than being a queer relation of embodiment, it tums out to

be ju st one more example of the familiar relation that holds, for in stanc e, between
the word 'table' and its token inscriptions and utterances. (Dodd

I

Another problem is with the very idea of a general metaphysical theory,

2007,

p. 11)

consensus concerning the best general metaphysical theory, because the
latter

excludes

musical ontology. On this conception our best 'general'

metaphysical theory is our best

basic

metaphysical theory-a theory of

individuals, properties, modality, and causation, say. One problem for
this conception would clearly be demarcating what is metaphysically basic

One response to Dodd's approach, then, is simply to reiterate the 'primacy

in a non-question-begging way. Another, related problem is the mirror

of practice', the trumping of the metaphysical constraint by the pragmatic

image of the problem with the inclusive conception: it is plausible that

constraint. So David Davies argues that '[s)omething that only admitted of

moving on from these 'basics' to more complicated things such

as

musical

the sort of appreciation and evaluation permitted by [Dodd's theory] would

works could introduce considerations that will lead us to add to or alter the

(2009,

ontology required to cover the basics. An interesting application of this

not

be

a work of art in the sense that interests us as philosophers'

163).

p.

Here are two more responses.

point can be found in Zoltan Gendler Szab6's introduction to nominalism

e.g. Loux and Zinunennan (2003) and Le Poidevin, Simons, McGonigal, and Camer o n (2009). For
the best consideration ofWhitehead's famous aphori sm that I am aware of. see Lachs (1995).
Dodd spends five pages early in his book dismissing nom.inalism about musical works, emplo ying
standard moves in the debate over universals. For responses to these moves, see Caplan and Matheson
(2006, 2008) and Tillman (2011).
•

of the constraint is somewhat rough and ready, in part because those who
it rarely do so explicitly. For an attempt at working out mo re explicitly the proper
relationship between the metaphysics of an and general meta physi cs, from a perspective sympathetic
to the metaphysical constraint, see Mag Uidhir (t his volume, Introduction).
•

This characterization

subscribe to

'0
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(Szabo 2003). Discussing the problem of the causal isolation of abstracta, he
notes that '[t]his sort of argument is applied all the time across the board
against all sorts of abstracta, but the fact that it was originally presented in the
context of the philosophy of mathematics is of utmost importance' (p. 29).
He goes on to give the example of Jaroslav Hasek's novel The Good Soldier
Sweik, which is 'presumably an abstract entity, but one that is
causally dependent on a host of concrete ones' such as its author and the
Austro-Hungarian monarchy's involvement in the First World War, and
upon which many other concreta depend, such as Szab6's use of it as an
example (pp. 29-30). Szab6's point is precisely that if we ignore things more
complicated than the metaphysical basics, we run the risk of oversimplifying
our metaphysics.
What kind of ontological theory of musical works do we end up
with, then, if we forget the metaphysical constraint and apply the pragmatic
constraint? We get a non-standard Platonism, that is, a theory according to
which musical works are abstract objects, but with features not traditionally
attributed to abstracta. One locus classicus here is Jerrold Levinson's 'What a
Musical Work ls' (199oa [first published 1980]), though Levinson has
modified his view over time. 11 Levinson argues that, as features (i) and
(ii) mentioned above suggest, musical works are abstract objects, something
like abstract, multiply instamiable structures of sounds. But, as features (iii)
and (v) suggest, they are not simply sound structures, for two different
musical works could share a sound structure, and yet differ in their aesthetic
properties as a consequence of who composed them, and whei;i. One might
be a simple, naiVe piece, for instance, while the other is simple in the service
of a kind of primitivism or biting irony. Those sympathetic to Levinson's
approach have suggested modifications of the view in light of other
features of musical works. In particular, the normativity and modal flexibil
ity of musical works have been discussed. The upshot is that the consensus
among those who subscribe to the pragmatic constraint and reject the
metaphysical constraint is that the best ontological theory of musical
works is that they are something like structures of performed sounds made
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normative by the production of a score in a particular creative act.12 The details of
the theory are not important for our purposes. The question is: Are there in
fact any such things? Thoroughgoing nominalists will think not. I now
tum to motivations for such a view.

III. Motivations for Nominalism about

Musical Works
David Davies says that '[t)o offer an "ontology of art" not subject to the
pragmatic constraint would be to change the subject, rather than answer the
questions that motivate philosophical aesthetics' (2004, p. 21). It's not clear
why we couldn't extend this principle to other cultural practices, such as
religion. It seems just as plausible to say that to offer an 'ontology of religion'
not constrained by rational reflection on what religious practices imply
about the nature of God or witches, say, would be to change the subject,
rather than answer the questions that motivate philosophical theology.
(Davies himself draws an analogy with philosophy of science.) The
challenge this suggests to the ontologist of art is that though the pragmatic
constraint will deliver our best concept of a musical work, it will not
guarantee that anything falls under that concept.
One response to this challenge is to point out that though the pragmatic
constraint does not guarantee that anything falls under our concept of a
musical work, this is no reason to think that the concept is in fact empty.
Furthermore, the general ontological principle appealed to above-that we
should believe in the things implied by our best theories--suggests a
relevant difference between musical works and supernatural entities, namely
that our best theories of the world (including the cultural world) imply that
musical works exist, but that those same theories imply that there are no
witches or gods. One problem with supernatural entities, for instance,
unlike musical works, is that they (arguably) conflict with scientific theories.

•• This liceracure is coo extensive co sununarize here, but for a recent example see Matheson and

Caplan

(2008). They consider challenges co Levinsonian

views on the basis of che modal Rex.ibilicy of

musical works, and end up defending the plausibility of something very close co Levinson's own view
11

See, in particular, Levinson (1990b, 1996, and this volume Ch. 2.).

(though they do not endorse the view).
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Nominalists, however, will claim that there is just such a conftict
perhaps an even deeper one-between our best concept of musical works
and our best overall theories of the world: our best concept of musical
works implies they are abstract objects, and our best theories of the world
make no reference to abstract objects. The Platonist might try to reply to
this argument in the same way I suggested she should reply to a proponent
of the 'metaphysical constraint': she might claim that to exclude the evi
dence for musical works from the evidence base for our best overall
ontological theory is to beg the question against the Platonist. But the
situation is different here. The nominalist is not (or should not be) appealing
to some pre-existing, settled metaphysical theory. He is arguing that, even
when we have taken the evidence of musical practice into account, a theory
without abstracta, and thus without anything like what we take musical
works to be, is preferable to one that posits abstracta. Presumably whatever
the details of the argument here, a major component will be an appeal to
something like Occam's Razor. We would thus have to attempt to weigh
the ontological savings of rejecting abstracta against the costs in other aspects
of the theory, such as simplicity. Obviously at this level of generality there is
nothing I can say that should sway us one way or the other; to go further
with this debate we would have to turn to particular arguments for
or against thoroughgoing nominalism.
It is noteworthy that musical nominalists do not say much to motivate
their thoroughgoing nominalism. They usually briefly appeal to problems of
causal interaction with abstracta, particularly the creation of musical works,
and then move quickly on to considering nominalist proposals. (See, for
example, Caplan and Matheson 2oo6 and Cameron 2008.) There are several
responses the Platonist can give to the initial problem of causal interaction or
creatability. I have already discussed the first in connection with the meta
physical constraint. Our conception of musical works could just as easily
(and perhaps less dogmatically) be taken as evidence that some abstracta are
capable of causal interaction, including creation, as that they cannot be
abstracta. In other words, the norninalist's dialectic here seems to rely on the
(bankrupt) metaphysical constraint. Second, there are of course resources
available to the Platonist for giving a positive account of the nature of
musical works as abstract and creatable. For instance, Caplan
and Matheson (2004) suggest some promising strategies for defending a
conception of musical works as sets or types that are creatable, and Simon

PLATONISM VS. NOMINALISM
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Evnine has suggested that creation does not require causal interaction, in the
case of either concreta or abstracta (2009, pp. 214-15, esp. fu. 25).
What this suggests is that the norninalist's motivation resides wholly
in quite general motivations for nominalism which are seldom, if ever,
engaged with. Perhaps it is too much to expect the nominalist about musical
works to provide arguments for nominalism in general. However, this does
mean that the nominalist's case is built on a conditional: if there are no
abstracta, then musical works must be thus and so. This comes out pretty
explicitly in Chris Tillman's consideration of various nominalist theories
of musical works: 'If there is a presumption in favor of the material over
the abstract, and if the main motivation for musical materialism is that
materialism is untenable ... , then musical abstractionism is unmotivated'
(2011, p. 28, emphasis removed).13 The nominalist might reply that the
Platonist's case is similarly built on a conditional: if there are abstracta, then
musical works must be thus and so. However, the Platonist has the dialectical
advantage here, because, thanks to the pragmatic constraint, the 'thus-and-so'
in the case of the Platonist is how we ordinarily conceive of musical works.
This means that (a) other things being equal, there's a smaller cost to accepting
the antecedent of the Platonist's conditional than the nominalist's;14 and (b) it
gives us some (perhaps slight) reason to think there are abstracta. Nonetheless,
I doubt these brief reflections will do much to sway anyone already inclined
to thoroughgoing nominalism. I thus turn now to the ontological options
open to a thoroughgoing nominalist when it comes to musical works.

IV. Contemporary Nominalism about Musical Works
The broad sense in which I am using the term 'nominalism' encompasses a
variety of ontological theories of musical works. One group of nominalist
theories is the materialist theories, according to which a musical work is
some kind of concrete entity, such as a collection of performances or the

" In the ellipsi s, Tillman refers to the arguments typically marshalled against materialism, which

he finds wanting. He considers these arguments on pp. 20-8. The details do not affect the point I am
making here.
" The 'other things' in this case are elements of the debate between thoroughgoing nominalists and

Platonists. Of course this debate may well not be equal, but pan of my goal here is just to see how

ontologies ofmusic relate to more general onrologic al theories.
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particular creative action of a composer. Chris Tillman (20II) has recently

there aren't really any musical works. The reason this isn't a contradiction,

produced a useful menu of some options for the materialist about musical

according to Cameron, is that the truth conditions of ordinary English

works. Call whatever you think the concrete manifestations of musical

sentences such as 'there are many musical works' do not require that there

works are (scores, performances, recordings, etc.) the work's atoms.

be any things which are musical works. On the other hand, when we

According to musical perdurantism, a musical work is the fusion of its

(truthfully) say things such as 'there aren't really any musical works',

atoms, and those atoms are its temporal parts.15 According to musical

we are speaking 'Ontologese', the language of metaphysics or fundamental

endurantism, a musical work is its atoms, but only one at a time, as it were;

reality. The truth conditions of sentences in Ontologese do require there to

it is wholly present in each atom, rather than being identified with the
fusion of its atoms. According to musical spannerism, a musical work
is coextensive with its atoms, but it is not identical to them, nor are they
its parts. (As Tillman says, 'spanning is weird' (2ou, p. 19 fu. 27).)
Another group of nominalist theories is eliminativist theories, according
to which there are only concrete objects, such as performances and the
creative actions of composers, and none of these can be identified with
musical works; therefore there are no musical works. Few have defended
eliminativism about musical works. Richard Rudner (1950) is the closest we
have to a classic source, though it is possible to interpret his position as
materialist. He argues that the best candidate ontological category for
musical works is that of abstract object, since it does better than any
other candidate (individual performance, set of performances, composer's
intention, etc.) at filling the role our musical practices carve out for it.
However, Rudner considers the peculiarities of the kind of abstractum
musical works would have to be, and the fact that they would have to be
created by composers, deal-breakers for Platonism about musical works. As
a result, he argues, we should stop speaking (at least strictly, as theorists)
of musical works, and talk instead only of performances, compositional
intentions, and so on.
Judging by the title of a recent article in the British Journal ofAesthetics,
'There Are No Things that are Musical Works', Ross P. Cameron (2008) is
also an eliminativist, though, like Rudner's, his position is not easy to

be referents for terms like 'musical work'. I have no space to discuss
Cameron's view in depth, in part because it is a general ontological position,
out of which this theory of musical works falls.16 I do think it is unstable,
however, and threatens to collapse into Doddian Platonism, eliminativism,
or fictionalism, depending on which elements of the theory one holds most
firmly to.
According to both kinds of nominalist theory I have considered here
materialism and eliminativism-there are no musical works of the kind
implied by our musical practices, since those practices imply that musical
f rence between the two theories is that
works are abstract. The major dife
the materialist sees the denial of the existence of musical works as a greater
theoretical cost than the eliminativist. Consider that, in some sense, the
materialist and eliminativist do not (or need not) disagree about the kinds of
things that exist.17 They both agree that there are no abstract objects (or,
at least, no abstract objects that are musical works). They do disagree about
whether there are any musical works, of course, but that is a disagreement
about whether musical works can plausibly be identified with some kind of
concrete entity, not about whether the kind of concrete entity in question
exists. Moreover, both these kinds of theory count it as a cost to deny the
existence of the kind of musical work implied by our musical practices. This
is evident in the case of the materialist by the use of the paraphrase strategy.
The materialist attempts to show that as many as possible of the claims we
make that at least appear to commit us to the existence of abstract musical

pigeon hole. Cameron argues that we can have our musical works and
eliminate them too. That is, he thinks that when we ordinarily say things
like 'there are many musical works', we say something true, even though

•• For some initial criticisms, see Stecker
17

(2009, pp. 378-80) and Predelli (2009).

I supply the qualification because any given materialist and eliminativist may of course ds
i agree

about the kind of things that exist. For insGJnce, one may be a perdurantist and the other an endurantist,
in which case they would (arguably) disagree about the existence of temporal pans (on some constmal of
that tenn). But this kind of disagreement is not relevant to the arguments I am currently considering. It is,

" Ben Caplan and Carl Matheson have defended musical perdurantism at some length (2004, 2006,
2008), primarily in dialogue with Julian Dodd (2002, 2004, 2007). You could even be forgiven for
thinking they subscribe to the view.

after all, a kind of disagreement two materialists could have. The only relevant disagreements here are
disagreements between the materialist and eliminativ��t qua materialist and elirninativist.
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works can be paraphrased into claims that commit us only to concreta. This

both materialism and elirninativism by on the kind of pragmatic grounds just

saves us from some kind of error (e.g. the error of failing to refer to anything

considered.20 The basic idea of fictionalism is that, given claims in some

when we attempt to refer to musical works), but attributes some other

domain that appear to commit us to the existence of things that do not

error to us (e.g. not realizing what we are referring to).18 But it is also

in fact exist, we should conclude that these claims are fictional, rather

evident in the case of the elirninativist, for the elirninativist does not

than assertoric.21 This

is

to be contrasted with the elirninativist strategy

(or need not) deny the existence of the concreta with which the materialist

of ceasing to make the given claims, and the materialist strategies of substi

identifies musical works. Why, then, does the eliminativist not subscribe to

tuting other claims or reinterpreting the given claims as referring to

materialism? Presumably because the eliminativist thinks that it would

something that does exist.22

do less violence to musical practice to deny the existence of musical
works altogether than to identify them with the concreta the materialist
believes them to be. After all, eliminativism about musical works would
make no sense if the elirninativist did not believe both

(I)

of a musical work is that of a certain kind of thing; and

The basic motivation for fictionalism is that a realm of discourse may have

a value other than truth that justifies its continued use. For
Field (1980) argues that mathematics enables us to make

example, Hartry
inferences about

that our concept

empirical matters more easily than we could without it. Taken literally,

(2)

argues Field, mathematical statements commit us to the existence of

that there are

no such things.

numbers (conceived as abstracta), but we need not take them literally to

It is at this point that we see that the dispute between the materialist and

get what we want out of them. Thus, we should take them fictionally. Bas

the elirninativist is doubly pragmatic: it is pragmatic in the sense that the

van Fraassen

materialist and elirninativist agree about what kinds of things exist, but not

unobservable entities. He thinks the point of such discourse is not truth

about whether to call one kind of thing a musical work. Choosing between

but rather empirical adequacy, that is, roughly, the ability to predict and

the theories depends on one's purposes. The dispute is also pragmatic in

explain the observable.

the sense that the pragmatic constraint appears to be implicit common
ground. The question the norninalist

(1980)

is a fictionalist regarding scientific discourse about

These brief sketches are enough to distinguish two kinds of fictionalism:

faces when choosing between

hermeneutic (descriptive) and revolutionary (normative). Van Fraassen

materialism and eliminativism is whether it would be better to give up

purports to be giving an account of the nature of scientific discourse

talk of musical works altogether or to transform it into talk of, say, fusions

about unobservables, a nature it has possessed since long before his theory

of performances.19 And the measure of what is better here is dearly closeness

of it. He is thus a hermeneutic fictionalist-he offers an interpretation of

to, or coherence with, existing musical practices.

what has been going on in the discourse all along. Field, by contrast, argues
that mathematicians have actually been engaging in their discourse at face

V. Fictionalism about Musical Works
In this final section

I

will suggest that a virtually ignored ontological theory

of musical works-fictionalism-should be preferred by a norninlist over

20

Lydia Goehr is perhaps the best known fictionalist about music works (e.g. 2007, p. 106), though,

despite the title of the book in which she sets forth that theory, chis aspect ofit is noc often commenced
upon. Also, as I've just mentioned, Cameron's arguments could be given a fictionalist spin, though he
would clearly rather you just left them alone.
21

l wiJJ not say much about what it is for a claim to be fictional, to adopt a fictional attitude towards a

proposition, and so on (likewise for assertion). For an introduction to these topics in connection with
fictionalism, and the literature on them, see Eklund (2007, Section

2) and Sainsbury (2010).

" Matti Eklund claims that this makes fictionalism primarily a linguistic rather than an ontological

theory, albeit one chat is usually motivated by 0111ological concerns (2007, Section
18

2.1). But the same

reasoning would suggest that materialism is primarily a linguistic thesis, when it is generally considered an
There may be disagreement among materialists about exactly which errors we are committing and

saved from.
•• It is che fact that this would be a

transfonnation of musical

discourse that leads me co say, as l did in

the introduction, chat materialism about musical works is not realism about musical works.

ontological theory. On the one hand, I think it would be misleading to think of fictionalism as a
linguistic thesis in contrast to the other kinds of theories I have been considering here. On the other
hand, I do chink it is valuable to bring out the interconnection oflinguistic and ontological matters, as
I have tried to do already in comparing materialism and eliminativism.
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general is valuable, musical practices involving the work concept are perni

entities that do not actually exist. He argues that enlightened mathemat

cious. One might even think that what is valuable about these practices

icians ought to stop asserting such claims, and start making them fictionally

could be retained, and its perniciousness expunged, by reformulating

instead. He is thus a revolutionary fictionalist.23

the practice (including its discourse) to eliminate the work concept.

What is the relevant discourse in the case of fictionalism about musical

I think this is implausible, but it is not too far from some views that have

works? It is musical discourse-precisely the discourse that gives rise

actually been defended in musicology and philosophy of music.27 For

to questions about the ontology of musical works, and theories that purport

example, Lydia Goehr concludes that:

to answer those questions.24
What

kind

of fictionalist

should

you

be

about

musical works?

I recommend revolutionary fictionalism. It seems implausible (to me) that

[i]n the end, musicians mustjust ask themselves whether the most satisfactory form
of musical criticism is one that is based on the ideal of

Werktreue

[faithfulness to

a work]. Ifit is not, they must seek an alternative. No musician is necessarily bound

in ordinary musical discourse people are not committed to the existence of

to this ideal, however pervasive and persuasive the romantic aesthetic. (2007,

musical works as distinct entities, that they are already speaking about them

p.

fictionally. Application of the pragmatic constraint gives us our best theory
ofthe kind of thing people are referring to (or attempting to refer to) in such
discourse. If you don't think there are any such things, and are tempted by
fictionalism, then you should think that people

ought,

when speaking

strictly, to adopt a fictional attitude towards them; that is, you should be a
revolutionary fictionalise.25
i the value of musical discourse about works that justifies retaining
What s

it despite its falsehood? It is the value of those musical practices that are
enmeshed with that discourse-practices (apparently) involving musical
works-whatever that value is. This raises a number of issues. The most
obvious is what the value of musical practices involving works is. I take it
that a large part of the answer to this question will be a general theory of the
value ofmusic. I don't have one to hand, but I take it as uncontroversial that
music is very valuable.26 One might, of course, argue that although music in

279)

She explicitly leaves such questions open, but to do even this is clearly
far from a ringing endorsement of work-based musical practices. Lee B.
Brown

(20u)

also bemoans musical ontologists' obsession with the work

concept, but he is more concerned that the obsession has led ontologists
to mischaracterize certain musical traditions, rather than that practices
involving the work concept are less valuable than they could be.
On the other hand, it is possible to construct an argument for precisely
the opposite conclusion: that musical practices involving works are more
valuable than those without the concept. The basic idea would be that
the works are enduring entities that thus admit of (i) being worked on over
time by their creators; and (ii) being appreciated on multiple occasions of
reception by their audiences.

I

doubt disagreement over these issues

will have much effect on musical practices, even in combination with
fictionalism. It seems unlikely we'll reach a philosophical consensus about
the values of musical practices such that entire practices will be given up.

" I am no great fan ofthese tenns, since it's not clear to me that revolutionary fictionalism is any more

And, when it comes to fictionalism, it is practical matters-the value of

did

disturbing to our usual way ofthinking about what goes on in a domain ofdiscourse than henneneutic

some discourse other than truth-that count. Anyway, if we

fictionalism. But the terms are well established, so I will nm with them. Note that materialists can also be

a consensus about the values of music and this significantly affected

divided into hemteneutic and revolutionary camps, according to whether they claim the paraphrases
they provide for ontologically-conunitting claims supply what we act11ally mean by those claims, or what

reach

our musical practices, it would not make sense to bemoan the fact. If we

we 011glrt to mean by those claims.

" As the pragmatic constraint suggests, 1 take non-linguistic behaviours to be relevant to our
interpretation of the discourse. I assume this is uncontroversial.
2'

That said, whether you plump for hermeneutic or revolutionary fictionalism might depend on

other commitments you have n
i the philosophy oflanguage. For further distinctions between varieties of
fictionalism, see Eklund

(2007, Section 2).

26 For an introduction to theories of the value of music, see Goldman (2011); Gracyk (2011); and

S. Davies (2003).

27

Ofcourse, if we decided to get rid ofthe work concept alt0gether, due to its perniciousness, the

problem ofthe ontology ofmusical works would disappear, just as we are no longer concerned with the
nature of witches.
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were to discover the true end of music, i t would behoove u s to strive to

works is (or ought to be) a fiction, and that the practices it is enmeshed in are

achieve it.28

valuable for reasons other than the acquisition of truths, there can be no

Finally, there is some disagreement about which musical practices really

question about the legitimacy of the pragmatic constraint. The story we

involve the work concept. For instance, I have argued that much jazz is a

should tell ourselves about musical works s
i the one implicit in our musical

tradition without musical works (Kania 2oub). Goehr argues that the work

practice.

concept entered Western classical musical practice much later than most

Why should a contemporary nominalist about musical works prefer

) But, if correct, these theories do not

fictionalism over materialism or eliminativism? As we saw at the end

philosophers suppose (Goehr

2007 .

affect

musical

fictionalism

about

works,

which

is

only

about

of Section IV, what motivates the choice between different nominalist

musical discourses that do, implicitly or explicitly, refer to musical works.

theories of musical works is how closely each theory hews to existing

We might compare this with van Fraassen's 'constructive empiricism':

musical practices. Fictionalism has certain advantages here. It looks, at first

van Fraassen is a fictionalist only about the unobservable entities posited by

glance, as if we do not need to alter our musical practices at all . We

scientific theories; he believes that when it comes to observable entities

can continue to talk about musical works in just the ways we have always
talked about them.31 On closer inspection, however, there are a couple of

science aims at the truth.
It is worth noting that the rooting of the musical-works fiction in musical

changes. First, and most significantly, the fictionalism I have recommended

practice means that fictionalism about musical works is immune to

is 'revolutionary' in that it recommends moving from a musical-works

an objection raised against fictionalism about some other things, such as

discourse aimed at truth to a musical-works discourse aimed at whatever

possible worlds or moral values. R.M. Sainsbury, for instance, argues that in

the value is of practices involving such discourse. So though the practice,

both these latter cases the fictionalist faces a serious problem about how to

including the discourse, may look the same on the surface, it will be

choose the fiction we ought to subscribe to (2010, pp.

) This is

operating in a different way. What would in the past have been assertions

because fictionally subscribing to a possible-worlds story, for instance,

about musical works, for instance, ought really, according to the fictionalist,

is supposed to help us discover modal truths-what is really possible or

to be put forward as make-believe. Second, as we have just seen, it is

190-2, 200-4 .

necessary.29 But without knowing such things, we will be at a loss to choose

conceivable that the fictionalist with a complete theory would recommend

between different possible-worlds stories (for instance, between a story

that some practices be changed, in light of the value of musical

according to which one has at most one counterpart in any possible world

practices involving discourse about works. But this is not a consequence

and a story according to which one has more than one counterpart in some

of fictionalism in particular, since the change is due to the theory of musical

possible worlds). Since the value of musical discourse is not epistemic, it

value, not the fictionalism. A Platonist about musical works with a theory

does not face this objection.30 If we grant that our discourse about musical

about the value of practices involving musical-works discourse could just as
easily suggest that certain musical practices ought to be changed.
It seems to me that the best response the materialist can give to this line of

'" This dialectic might be taken even one step further: one might attempt a transcendental argument
that there must be a diversity ofmusical valut:s since humanity cannot be wrong in pursuing the diversity

reasoning is to press on the fact that, according to fictionalism, there are no

of musical practices it in fact pursues. But we're now in uncomfortably deep waters.
" The fictionalist about possible worlds is not (thereby) a fictionalist about modality 10111 co1m, just as

the ficcionalist about musical works is not (thereby) a fictionalise about music 10111 r<>1tr1. Hence the

unsuitability of the labels 'modal fictionalism' and 'musical fictionalism', despite their appealing brevity

there will be any way for us (practically? psychologically? theoretically?) to neutrally evaluate moral
fictions for how well they achieve that end. That seems an unjustified assumption. To my mind, the

(Sainsbury 2010, pp. •?9-80).

bigger problem for the moral fictionalise is how to avoid the charge that the end substituted for moral

convinced by Sainsbury's arguments against moral fict:ionalism. Sainsbury argues that the moral fiction

fictionalist was motivated by rejecting in the first place (i.e. an objective value).

>• I choose fictionalism about possible worlds as my illustrative example because I am not so

alist is also in a quandary about which story about moral values to choose, that she will end up choosing
the story that gives the results she antecedently believe in. But he grants that engaging with the moral

fiction might be useful for non-moral ends such as prudential self-interest. What he seems to reject is that

value (e.g. prudential self-interest) is not being appealed to as exactly the kind of entity the moral
" I pass over the distinction between the messiness ofactual musical practice and the cleaner theory
we achieve by a process of aiming at reflective equilibrium.

216

ANDREW K A N I A

PLATONISM V S . N O M I N A L I S M

217

musical works. The appearance of congruity with our discourse about

i there are no abstracta of the sort we seem committed to in our
ultimately, f

musical works is merely a fa�ade, since we take that discourse to be about

musical discourse about works, we ought to be fictionalises about musical

musical works. The fictionalist's response to this is to press on the idea that the

works. For all I've said here, however, the nominalist still faces the challenge

value of our musical-works discourse is not truth, but instead whatever

of showing that there are no such abstracta.

the value is of the broader musical practice that includes that discourse.32
I am not sure what response the eliminativist can plausibly give to the
fictionalist. In a sense, fictionalism is just an eliminativism that preserves our
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